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ANNA L. GEORGE* & RICHARD L. MAYDEN"

Species Concepts and the Endangered
Species Act: How a Valid Biological
Definition of Species Enhances the
Legal Protection of Biodiversity
ABSTRACT
There is no single accepted definition of a "species" in the natural
sciences, nor does the Endangered Species Act (ESA) offer one.
Instead, prolonged debate over species concepts has allowed
various stakeholders to embrace and defend particulardefinitions
based upon personal agendas that may be at odds with the
objectives of the ESA. The best approach to arriving at a
biologically accuratedefinition of a "species" is to use a hierarchy
of species concepts to compare diversity across all taxonomic
groups and not to limit recognition of species to groupings
identifiable by humans using one particulartechnique. Adopting
this hierarchy of concepts will provide theoretically sound and
empirically testable data enabling the most accurate identification
of species-level biodiversity.
INTRODUCTION
[K]nowledge and understandingoften do not lie in definitions.'
The growing threat of extinction of biodiversity worldwide has
prompted an interdisciplinary response emphasizing the need for
greater and more effective conservation efforts. Because conservation of
biological diversity requires logical collaboration, cooperation, and
communication among policy makers, lawyers, educators, management
officials, and biologists, differences between the jargon and the ultimate
goals of the different disciplines represented by these occupations can
serve as one of the biggest obstacles to achieving effective conservation
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policies. Given these differences among disciplines, it is not surprising
that there is confusion, frustration, and disappointment when issues
central to these various fields overlap.
Laws may be written with complex, yet necessary, procedural
requirements that have no obvious purpose or meaning to biologists.
Many environmental cases brought to trial result in decisions based
upon legal, not biological, interpretations of the statutes in question.
Historically, the result has been limited effective progress in both
understanding the need for conservation and the enforcement of
conservation of biodiversity -particularly in the absence of a conscious
effort by members of the various stakeholder disciplines to further their
understanding of key concepts, needs, and issues central to other
disciplines. Hence, while it is clear that an interdisciplinary response to
the worldwide conservation and biodiversity crisis is needed, education
and training must be implemented across disciplines for such an agenda
to be successful.
Clearly, one of the major barriers to interdisciplinary
conservation efforts is the unique and often complex terminology
necessary for any disciplinary practice. Although such terminology may
be commonly used within a profession, it may also be poorly understood
or defined by those within or outside a particular field of study. In some
instances, words that are known to be contentious within a discipline
create so much controversy that many practitioners give up hope of
understanding the meaning, avoid the dialogue, or end up employing a
definition that is wrong or incomplete because of personal frustration or
purely the attitude that research must progress in a discipline despite
controversy over terminology. This phenomenon has happened to many
of the most essential concepts in the physical and natural sciences,
including definitions for various terms, such as planet, ecosystem,
community, or wetlands. 2 As with these essential concepts, there is no
universally accepted definition for a biological species. However,
because the species is such a fundamental unit in most scientific
research, those concerned with conservation within and outside of the
biological sciences have mistakenly felt secure that the word was well
understood, universally accepted, and not an area for debate.
Almost 30 years after the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 3 was
written, agencies administering the Act are still unclear as to how to

2. See Richard L. Mayden, On Biological Species, Species Concepts and Individuationin the
NaturalWorld, 3 FISH & FISHERIES 171, 192 (2002).
3. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
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recognize the "species" they should be protecting. 4 Moreover, biologists
have been unable to reach clear agreement on how to define the word
"species." Although it is commonly held that species are the
quintessential building blocks of natural history and the fundamental
measurable unit of biodiversity, the means by which we can confidently
quantify their existence and members are not agreed upon. 5 Discussions
involving various conceptualizations of species 6 proliferate in systematic
biology; however, there is little consensus regarding what is an
7
appropriate way to universally delineate and quantify species diversity.
Because new species are continually being discovered, even in
the United States, it is important that their legal definition reflect the
biological reality of these entities as they exist in nature and that the
parties interested in an interdisciplinary movement to protect and
conserve biodiversity are made fully aware of the critical issues
involved. With continued disagreement, confusion, and apathy about
species concepts or definition in the biological sciences, it is difficult to
articulate a clear policy, grounded in biology, that can be used in the
8
ESA to protect real biodiversity.

4. See Daniel J. Rohf, There's Something Fishy Going on Here: A Critique of the National
Marine FisheriesService's Definition of Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 24 ENVTL. L.
617, 618 (1994).

5. See Richard L. Madyen, Consilience and a Hierarchy of Species Concepts: Advances
Toward Closure on the Species Puzzle, 31 J. NEMATOLOGY 95, 95 (1999).
6. The phrase "species concept" is used to avoid the limitations that are inherent
within a set definition. As defined in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (1998), a
concept is "1 : something conceived in the mind : THOUGHT, NOTION 2 : an abstract or
generic idea generalized from particular instances." When a new species is discovered, the
published document that formally recognizes and names this new species is referred to as a
"species description." Species can only be described, not defined, as a definition would set
limits on something that is constantly changing. Species are identified in nature by various
methods employed by scientists that are closely tied to the concept used. In this article, the
term "species concepts" will be used during the discussions of biological conceptualizations of species, while "species definition" will be used during discussions of the legal
definition of species.
7. See, e.g., SPECIES CONCEPTS AND PHYLOGENETIC THEORY: A DEBATE (Quentin D.
Wheeler & Rudolf Meier eds., 2000) (prominent scientists were invited to present a series of
papers documenting their position on favored species concepts); see also Edward 0. Wiley,
The Evolutionary Species Concept Reconsidered,27 SYSTEMATIC ZOOLOGY 17, 18 (1978); Richard
L. Mayden & Robert M. Wood, Systematics, Species Concepts, and the Evolutionary Significant
Unit in Biodiversity and Conservation Biology, 17 AM. FISHERIES SOC'Y SYMP. 58, 84 (1995).
These examples are only a small selection of the wide-ranging literature available on these
concepts.
8. See Ray Vaughan, State of Extinction: The Case of the Alabama Sturgeon and Ways
Opponents of the Endangered Species Act Thwart Protectionfor Rare Species, 46 ALA. L. REV. 569,
586 (1995).
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The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how adopting a
theoretically sound and empirically testable definition of a species will
enhance the effectiveness of the ESA and facilitate the international,
interdisciplinary conservation effort. Section I provides an overview of
the ESA, with a brief summary of major related court decisions. Section
II discusses how a faulty application of species concepts or definitions
will lead to bad decisions, both biologically and legally. Section III
explains how an appropriate species concept hierarchy can be used to
identify and protect units of biodiversity, allowing for a closer union of
science and law for conservation purposes.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ACT
The Endangered Species Act, often hailed as our landmark
environmental law, was written to protect biodiversity with little regard
for its impact upon humans. It is one of the first environmental laws
without a cost-benefit analysis, thus requiring the government to place a
high status on protection of biodiversity. The purpose of the ESA is to
identify imperiled species, delineate methods of providing them
protection, 9 prevent future harm to the species, 10 and penalize harm that
occurs.' Section 2 is the substantive part of the statute, declaring the
purpose and policy of the ESA. Specifically, it requires that species be
protected because of their "esthetic, ecological, educational, historical,
12
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people."
Definitions for terms used within the ESA are contained in Section 3,13
which will be discussed later.
Section 4 creates the means by which imperiled taxa are listed as
threatened or endangered. No species is given any protection under the
ESA until officially listed by the government, no matter how near
extinction it may be.14 Thus, Section 4 describes what dangers may cause
a species to become endangered, as well as the procedure for federal
listing of a species. Listing decisions are made "solely on the basis of the
best scientific and commercial data available" to the Secretary of the
Interior. l5 The goal behind the listing is not merely to prevent extinction;
federal agencies must provide sufficient resources so the species is able
to recover and ultimately be removed from the list.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

16 U.S.C. § 1533.
Id. § 1536.
Id. §§ 1538,1540.
Id. § 1531(a)(3).
Id. § 1532.
Id. § 1533(a)(3).
Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
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Once the species is federally listed, different resources are to be
made available to aid the goal of conservation. The Secretary of the
Interior must publish a list of all endangered and threatened species and
must review this list at least every five years. 16 Furthermore, the
Secretary must also oversee the designation of "critical habitat" 17 and
implement "recovery plans" 18 to aid in the survival of the species. Thus,
the requirements of Section 4 are assigned to the Secretary of the Interior,
as aided by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), and include identifying, listing,
monitoring, and protecting imperiled species through the use of
regulations and recovery plans.
One of the major impacts of the ESA comes from the
requirements placed upon federal agencies to compel their cooperation
in environmental matters. All federal agencies are directed to ensure that
their actions do not jeopardize the listed species or their critical habitat. 19
Thus, if a federal action occurs in an area likely to contain endangered
species, biological assessments must be made before these actions are
carried out. 20 Although the law is targeted at federal actions, a private
party or other governmental body may also be subject to this law if
operating under a federal lease or other federal involvement. 21 Section 7
also creates the Endangered Species Committee, which is able to grant an
exemption for the other requirements of Section 7 should the Committee
deem it necessary. 22
The final operative part of the ESA is contained in Section 9,
which lists prohibited activities involving endangered species, all of
which are considered "takings." Under the ESA, it is illegal to import,
export, possess, move, sell or hold listed species. 23 Section 9 applies not

16. Id. § 1533(c).
17. Defined in § 1532(5)(A) to include the specific areas both within and outside the
geographic range of the species, so long as it is "essential to the conservation of the
species." The purchase of this land is covered by funds designated in § 1534(a); this critical
habitat purchase has been the basis for the creation of many of the lands in the National
Wildlife Refuge system.
18. Id. § 1533(0. Recovery plans contain descriptions of management actions,
measurable criteria to determine when species may be removed from the list, and estimates
of the time required and costs involved in reaching these goals.
19. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
20. Id. § 1536(c).
21. See Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 715
(Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that ESA applies to applicants for leases for offshore drilling
as well as the government).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(e) (colloquially known as the "God Squad" due to the
Committee's power to determine the fate of a species).
23. Id. § 1538(a)(1).
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only to the federal government, but to all persons, agencies, and
organizations, whether or not they are aware the species is listed.
Despite these explicit and strong protective measures for species,
exceptions are allowed. For example, Section 10 allows for "incidental
take" permits to be issued following delineated procedures. 24
The definitions outlined in Section 3 probably have created the
most controversy with respect to the ESA, largely resulting from
different interpretations of both the definitions found within the
legislation and specific words used within those definitions. 25 For
instance, "take" is defined with the string of verbs, "to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to
engage in any such conduct." 26 Most of these verbs offer a very clear
picture of an intentional act of damage to an individual member of a
species, but the words "harass" and "harm" are not as clear in
identifying whether the target is to a single organism, a population, or
the species as a whole. Thus, the FWS has provided further clarification
as to what constitutes harming and harassing species. "Harass" is
defined as "an intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the
likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to
significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include, but are
not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering." 27 The Code of Federal
Regulations goes on to define "harm" as "an act which actually kills or
injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or
sheltering." 28 Both of these definitions emphasize that the "taking" of an
endangered species can occur across populations, not merely to an
individual organism. Precedent cases involving these definitions and
their ramifications are discussed briefly below.
The other contested definition given under Section 3 is that of a
species: "The term 'species' includes any subspecies of fish or wildlife or
plants, and any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate
fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature." 29 This definition does
not define a species at all; it merely provides for protection of groups
below the species level. This omission could be read as a deferment to

24. Id. § 1539(a)(2) (one such procedure may be the adoption of an approved Habitat
Conservation Plan to mitigate the harm to the species and its critical habitat).
25. Id. § 1532.
26. Id. § 1532(19).
27. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002).
28. Id.
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16).
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allow for a scientific, not legal, judgment of species status. Instead, this
language actually creates a loophole in which the protection offered by
the ESA is vulnerable because section 3 offers no guidelines to aid in
identifying species. Unfortunately, species identification is an area of
biology that is still quite contentious; there is no single accepted method
for recognizing species. 30 As discussed below, the definition of species is
an important issue, equal in importance to the conflict generated over
the aforementioned terms "take" or "harm."
The first major case to draw attention to the problem of species
31
definition was Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources.
Palila, 32 an endemic finch from Hawaii, were undergoing a decline
attributed to the loss of mamane and naio trees, critical habitat necessary
for the bird's feeding and breeding. 33 The decline of the mamane
ecosystem occurred on state lands maintained by the Hawaiian
Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) for hunting feral
sheep and goats. 34 However, the presence of the ungulates caused
overgrazing of the shoots and sprouts of mamane, ultimately resulting in
a decline in the regeneration of mamane trees. While there was no
35
concurrent competition between the palila and the ungulates for food,
the ungulates were causing habitat degradation of the forest, thus
36
harming the palila by preventing their recovery.
30.

See, e.g., John J. Wiens & Maria R. Servedio, Species Delimitation in Systematics:

Inferring Diagnostic Differences Between Species, 267 PROC. ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON SERIES B

631, 632 (2000); Jack W. Sites, Jr. & Jonathon C. Marshall, Delimiting Species: A Renaissance
Issue in Systematic Biology, 18 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 462, 462 (2003).
31.
32.

471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
U.S. FISH &WILDLIFE SERV., PALILA RECOVERY PLAN 6 (1986).

33. As defined in 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i), "critical habitat" includes those geographic
areas in the species' range "on which are found those physical or biological features (I)
essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which may require special management
consideration or protection." The critical habitat may not be established throughout the
entire species range except in circumstances determined by the Secretary of the Interior.
Thus, critical habitat is used to designate areas vital to the species' behavioral patterns,
such as breeding or feeding.
34. Palila,471 F. Supp. at 990.
35. The palila primarily fed upon the seeds and pods, so there was no direct
competition for food in the mamane, but, eventually, heavy grazing by goats upon the
forest would inhibit regrowth of the mamane to an extent that there were no seeds and
pods produced for palila consumption. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 32, at 10
(listing food sources for the palila); Palila,471 F. Supp. at 990 (listing mamane as a food
source for goats).
36. At the time Palila was first brought to court, "harm," as used in the ESA's
definition of "take," was defined as
an act or omission which actually injures or kills wildlife, including acts
which annoy it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt essential
behavioral patterns, which include, but are not limited to, breeding,
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The district court found that the palila were dependent upon the
mamane forests. 37 Moreover, the presence of the feral sheep and goats
were the main cause of the destruction of these forests, and the efforts of
the Hawaiian DLNR were inadequate to ensure the continued health of
the ecosystem. 38 Thus, the court concluded that the effects of the exotic
species on the palila were harmful enough to constitute an "unlawful
'taking' of the palila" under the regulations promulgated by the
39
Secretary of the Interior.
Just over a year later, the defendants filed an appeal challenging
the summary judgment of the district court and its finding of a
"taking." 40 In response, the Ninth Circuit Court declared that only two
material facts could result in a reversal of the lower court's summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs: (1) whether the palila were
endangered, and (2) whether the actions of the Hawaiian DLNR
constituted a taking. 41 Because the defendants did not offer sufficient
evidence of a factual dispute, there was no preclusion of summary
judgment. Moreover, the Circuit Court also affirmed the district court's
interpretation of the term "taking" as being that a species may be
harmed simply through habitat modification. 42 Thus, on the first appeal,
the palila were protected from habitat destruction on state land.
Five years later, circumstances in Hawaii had changed enough to
resurrect the case in Palila III.43 The facts and debates were virtually the
same, but the FWS had changed the definition of "harm," in the
meantime, to avoid a reading that would "include habitat modification
or degradation alone without further proof of death or injury." 44 Now
proof of habitat modification was not enough to protect a species; actual
injury to the species also had to be demonstrated. 45 Moreover, the feral
sheep and goats had been removed from the land in accordance with the
earlier rulings, but were replaced with domestic sheep, which the DNR
feeding, or sheltering; significant environmental modification or
degradation which has such effects is included within the meaning of
"harm"....

40 Fed. Reg. 44,412, 44,416 (Sept. 26, 1975).
37. Palila,471 F. Supp. at 989.
38. Id. at 990-91.
39. Id. at 995.
40. Palila,639 F.2d 495,495 (9th Cir. 1981).
41. Id. at 497.
42. Id. at 497-98.
43. Palila,471 F. Supp. at 989; Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 649 F. Supp.
1070, 1073 (D. Haw. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
44. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Final Redefinition of "Harm," 46
Fed. Reg. 54,748 (Nov. 4,1981).
45. Id.
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hoped would cause fewer problems. 46 Scientific studies showed a slight
increase in the numbers of the palila, but no definite upward trend in
population numbers. 47 Despite the new definition, the district court still
held that "a finding of 'harm' did not require death to individual
members of the species; nor did it require a finding that habitat
degradation was driving the species further toward extinction." 48 Judge
King stated that the revised definition of harm used by the Secretary of
the Interior "stresses the critical link between habitat modification and
injury to the species." 49 Thus, the court's ruling was resoundingly
similar to its earlier holding. A habitat modification could harm a species
by a direct negative impact on that species or simply an activity that
prevented the recovery of the species, even if the activity was carried out
by a non-human species. 50
The decision again was appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court,
which affirmed the lower court's ruling.5 1 However, this time the court
showed more hesitation when considering the magnitude and duration
of habitat degradation that could be considered "harm." Although the
court did not contest that the presence of the sheep was harming the
palila, affirming the district court's ruling, it did not address the question
of the extent of habitat destruction. 52 Thus, PalilaII left unclear how the
court would deal with actions that prevent the recovery of the species
but do not drive it to extinction. Despite the lack of resolution to the
debate over habitat destruction, the court did set an important precedent
by maintaining that habitat degradation was a causal factor for harming
a species. 53
A new controversy about the definition of "harm" to a species
soon developed in a different setting. In 1992, small landowners and
logging and timber companies brought litigation against the Department
of the Interior for the vague definition of the word "harm." 54 Their goal
of logging and development was thwarted by the presence of the
endangered red-cockaded woodpecker and the threatened northern
46. Palila,471 F. Supp. at 989; Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 649 F. Supp.
1070, 1073 (D. Haw. 1986), affid, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
47. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 32, at 6.
48. Palila, 649 F. Supp. at 1075.
49. Id. at 1077.
50. Id.
51. Palila, 852 F.2d at 1111.
52. Id. at 1110-11.
53. Id. at 1108.
54. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279, 282
(D.D.C. 1992), affd sub nom. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
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spotted owl. 55 The plaintiffs tried a novel method of attacking the FWS
interpretation of "harm" by claiming it was too broad, and, thus, it must
be considered void for its vagueness. 56 Moreover, the plaintiffs argued
that no critical habitat protection was necessary for the northern spotted
57
owl because it was only threatened, not fully endangered.
The district court was able to resolve the issue by examining the
reauthorization of the ESA in 1982.58 The court noted that Congress was
aware of the Palila I and Palila II decisions and did not try to reverse the
decision through legislation. 59 Therefore, Congress had, by its inaction,
effectively affirmed the court's earlier decision, thus upholding the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of "harm." 60 Further, nothing in the definition
was too vague for appropriate enforcement. The district court also ruled
that the FWS afforded the same protection to threatened species because,
under Section 4(d), "the Secretary may by regulation prohibit with
respect to any threatened species any act prohibited under section
61
1538(a)(1)."
Following this ruling, there was an immediate appeal to the D.C.
Circuit Court.62 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court,
holding that nothing in the language of the ESA was too broad for
interpretation. 63 Judge Mikva added, "It is hard to imagine what
'incidental takings' might be other than habitat modification. Indeed, the
legislative history of the 1982 amendments reveals that habitat
64
modification was precisely what Congress had in mind."
The plaintiffs then submitted a second appeal to the D.C. Circuit
Court, contesting the definition of "harm" as promulgated by the FWS. 65
Upon rehearing, one judge changed his mind, shifting the balance of the
court.66 The D.C. Circuit's opinion was therefore modified, holding the
earlier definition of "harm" to be invalid. 67 In reaching its decision, the
court cited the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,68 written by Justice Scalia, in which the Court considered
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 284.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 286.
Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 1.
Id. at 5.
Id. at11.
Sweet Home Chapter of Comtys.for a Great Or., 17 F.3d at 1464.
Id.
Id. at 1472.
Id. at 1464 (citing to Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
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the issue of how best to discern the line between regulations preventing
harm and regulations withdrawing a benefit. 69
In Sweet Home III, the D.C. Circuit Court held that a farmer
harvesting crops or trees upon which a species depends was
withdrawing a benefit-a "harm" it identified as comparable to the
United States refraining from providing humanitarian aid to the people
of Somalia. 70 The court concluded that simply refraining from providing
a benefit to an endangered species was not "harm." Rather, "harm" had
to involve direct application of force. 71
The government petitioned immediately for a rehearing, but this
petition was denied on August 12, 1994.72 Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit
73
Court heard National Wildlife Federationv. Burlington Northern Railroad.
In its Burlington holding, although the court did not find that the actions
of Burlington Railroad created a significant impairment of the ability of
grizzly bears to recover, it essentially restated its Palila decision, omitting
mention of Sweet Home. 74 During this period, a district court within the
Ninth Circuit declined to use the Sweet Home precedent to overrule the
Ninth Circuit Court decision. The district court declared it would follow
the laws of the Ninth Circuit until the Supreme Court or the Ninth
Circuit itself reversed that decision. 75
In early 1995, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon (Sweet Home V) because
the split between the circuit courts had to be resolved. Beyond the
discrepancy of opinion within the Ninth and D.C. Circuits, several other
districts were also drawing different interpretations of "harm" and
"taking." 76 In a 6-to-3 majority, the Supreme Court held that the
Secretary was using a reasonable interpretation of "harm" by allowing
habitat modification to be within the definition of "take." 77 Justice
Stevens, who wrote the opinion, used an ordinary usage definition of
harm, found in Webster's dictionary, to affirm that the agency's
definition of "harm" used in the regulation was reasonable. 78 Justice

69. Id.
70. Id. at 1464-65.
71. Id.at 1465.
72. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 191 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
73. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508,1513 (9th Cir. 1994).
74. Id. at 1512-13.
75. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1313 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
76. See Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988); Swan View Coalition,
Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923 (D. Mont. 1992).
77. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
78. Id. at 697.
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Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas dissented, arguing
that the Act was not designed to protect populations, only individual
animals of the endangered species. 79 Moreover, Justice Scalia felt that
this reading imperiled an individual's use of property free from
government intervention. 80 Despite this note of dissension, the definition
of "harm" promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior was finally
upheld by the Supreme Court, again strengthening the ESA's regulatory
81
reach.
Because the definition of "harm" has been upheld so strongly,
opponents of the ESA have attempted to circumvent the act by attacking
the definition of the word "species" through questioning the scientific
method by which new species are discovered and described, and, thus,
questioning the legitimacy of species identified for listing. 82 In one
example, the taxonomic status of the Alabama sturgeon became a
controversial subject during a listing process that lasted for seven
years.8 3 Biologists had long been aware that this sturgeon was a distinct
species, and the American Fisheries Society had even considered it
84
endangered in 1989, before its official recognition as a distinct species.
The fish was described 85 as a new species by Williams and Clemmer in
1991.86 Two years later, the FWS published notice in the Federal Register
87
of the proposed listing.
In 1993, with the notice of the government's intention to list,
members of industry opposed to the listing began hiring their own
scientific panel to counter the findings of the FWS. The AlabamaTombigbee Rivers Coalition, a group of industries and state-agencies
making use of the rivers inhabited by the sturgeon, opposed the listing of

79. Id. at 717-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 721 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
81. Id. at 687.
82. Vaughan, supra note 8, at 605-06.
83. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule to List the Alabama
Sturgeon as Endangered, 65 Fed. Reg. 26,438, 26,443 (May 5, 2000) (list of endangered and
threatened wildlife codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2004)).
84. Jack E. Williams et al., Fishes of North America Endangered, Threatened, or of Special
Concern: 1989, FISHERIES, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 2, 3.
85. "Described" is the scientific term for a formal recognition and naming of a new
species in order to "present a general picture of the described taxon." ERNST MAYR,
PRINCIPLES OF SYSTEMATIC ZOOLOGY

265 (1969).

86. James E. Williams & Glenn H. Clemmer, Scaphirhynchus Suttkusi, a New Sturgeon
(Pisces: Acipenseridae) from the Mobile Basin of Alabama and Mississippi, ALA. MUSEUM NAT.
HIST. BULL., June 1, 1991, at 17, 20.
87. Proposed Endangered Status and Designation of Critical Habitat for the Alabama
Sturgeon, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,148 (June 15,1993).
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the Alabama sturgeon. 88 Fearing that the listing of the sturgeon would
lead to the protection of riverine habitat and the cessation of dredging to
permit barge traffic, the Coalition prognosticated economic ruin for the
state if the sturgeon was listed. 89 Looking for ways to prevent the listing,
the Coalition began to question the validity of scientific findings related
to the sturgeon. 90 Dr. Mike Howell, an ichthyologist from Samford
University in Birmingham, Alabama, argued on behalf of the Coalition
91
that the FWS proposal was based upon faulty science. Furthermore, he
argued, the listing process was futile because the sturgeon had not been
92
seen since 1985 and therefore must be extinct.
In 1993, the FWS convened a panel of expert ichthyologists to
93
validity of recognizing the sturgeon as a distinct species.
the
verify
None of the nine members of this panel was chosen from a pool
suggested by the Alabama congressional delegation, and the orders to
the panel changed immediately prior to its convening. Panel members
were asked to write a single report rather than submit individual
reports. 94 Although the panel concluded that the scientific evidence for
species status was legitimate, as announced through an FWS press
release, 95 the Coalition filed suit under the Federal Advisory Committee

88. Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Dep't of Interior, 26 F.3d 1103, 1105 (11th
Cir. 1994). See also Joe Nabbefeld, Controversial Report Backs Argument for Sturgeon,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 23,1993.
89. Vaughan, supra note 8, at 608-09. Although the listing process itself does not
require any economic consideration, the designation of critical habitat is made "on the basis
of the best scientific data available and after taking into consideration the economic
impact.. .of specifying any particular area as critical habitat." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2000).
Although this allows for some economic considerations, the Secretary must list areas that
have economic importance if "the failure to designate such area as critical habitat will
result in the extinction of the species concerned." Id.
90. David Pace, Scientists Conclude Sturgeon Not Genetically Unique, TUSCALOOSA NEWS,
Apr. 13, 1994, at 7B (implying that because this study was released only in a draft report
through the FWS, it was not subjected to the unbiased peer review process required for
publication in scientific journals).
91. Vaughan, supra note 8, at 606.
92. Id. For any animal, a lack of sighting for some years is not a clear sign of extinction.
For a list of fish species that were presumed extinct and were then later rediscovered after
periods longer than eight years, see Richard L. Mayden & Bernard R. Kuhajda, Systematics,
Taxonomy, and Conservation Status of the Endangered Alabama Sturgeon, Scaphirhynchus
Suttkusi Williams and Clemmer (Actinopterygii, Acipenseridae), 1996 COPEIA 241, 267.
93. Reopening of Comment Period, Public Hearing, and Availability of Panel Report
on Proposed Endangered Status and Designation of Critical Habitat for the Alabama
Sturgeon, 58 Fed. Reg. 55,036 (Oct. 25, 1993).
94. Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Dep't of Interior, 26 F.3d 1103, 1105 (11th
Cir. 1994).
95. Id. at 1105.
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Act (FACA),96 enacted to prevent secret bodies from giving advice to the
government. 97 The basis for the Coalition's lawsuit was the formation
and lack of notice of the convening of the panel. 98
In December 1993, while the FACA lawsuit was in court, the first
Alabama sturgeon since 1985 was caught, proving that the sturgeon was
not extinct. 99 Nevertheless, the suit was decided in favor of the Coalition,
and the finding of the panel was blocked. 100 This was the first time a
FACA suit was successful in an attempt to stop the listing process for an
endangered species) 0' Subsequently, Secretary Babbitt allowed for a sixmonth extension of the listing process, providing more time to study the
taxonomic status of the sturgeon, even though subspecies and distinct
population segments could be listed with their protected critical
habitat 0 2 In the meantime, the FWS forensic biologists, untrained in
systematics or taxonomy, conducted cursory genetic tests upon the fish
and released their finding that, because there were no genetic differences
between the Alabama sturgeon, shovelnose sturgeon, and pallid
sturgeon, they must not be valid species. 103 This article was not peerreviewed and was not published in the normal scientific means allowing
for any scientific review or rebuttal10 4 At the end of the six-month
extension, the FWS announced that it would not place the sturgeon on
the list, largely because the species was too rare to list and possibly
extinct, even though an individual had been captured six months
prior. 105
After this discouraging turn of events for environmentalists, the
listing process halted, although the state of Alabama enacted a five-year

96.

Federal Advisory Committee Act §§ 1-15, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 (2000).

97. See id. § 2.
98. Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition,26 F.3d at 1105.
99. Joe Nabbefeld, Net Turns Up Elusive Sturgeon, but DNA Test Urged on Pedigree,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Dec. 4, 1993, at 1A. See also Vaughan, supra note 8, at 624.
100. See Alabama-TombigbeeRivers Coalition, 26 F.3d at 1107.
101. Vaughan, supra note 8, at 627.
102. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Extension of the Final Decision to
List the Mobile River System Population of the Alabama Sturgeon as an Endangered
Species, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,970, 31,973-74 (proposed June 21, 1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R.
pt. 17).
103. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of Proposed Rule for
Endangered Status and Critical Habitat for the Alabama Sturgeon, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,794
(proposed Dec. 15,1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
104. Id.; see also Pace, supra note 90.
105. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of Proposed Rule for
Endangered Status and Critical Habitat for the Alabama Sturgeon, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,794
(proposed Dec. 15, 1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
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conservation plan to protect the sturgeon. 10 6 During the next three years,
10 7
four more sturgeons were found, proving the species was not extinct.
Mayden and Kuhajda published a peer-reviewed paper in a scientific
journal on the taxonomy of the sturgeon using meristic and mensural
10 8
In 1997, the
data, adding further scientific evidence of its distinctness.
Mobile
Resources,
Natural
and
Conservation
of
Department
Alabama
and
Fish
and
Coalition,
Rivers
District Corps, Alabama-Tombigbee
plan
conservation
Wildlife Service worked together to draft a voluntary
and continue surveying for the sturgeon. 1°9
Finally, in March 1999, the FWS again proposed the sturgeon for
endangered status. 110 Once more, this provoked opposition from
politicians and citizens in the state. The Coalition again challenged the
validity of designating the fish as a species, despite the additional
scientific evidence and lack of published research to the contrary."'
During the second listing process, concerns were voiced about the effect
of federal protection on the implementation of the 1997 Conservation
Plan for the sturgeon." 2 However, this final attempt to stop a mandatory
conservation plan was not successful and a few months later the
sturgeon was listed as an endangered species by the FWS. 113 The state
conservation agreement continued during the development of an FWS
114
recovery plan.
Given the success industry groups had in delaying the listing for
a period of nine years, it is likely that the tactic of contesting the validity
of the taxonomic studies will continue to occur with future proposed
listings. As discussed previously, it is largely seen as the duty of the
agencies in charge of endangered species to determine appropriate
species in need of protection. These agencies, in turn, commonly rely
106.
6D.
107.

Richard Shelby, Sturgeon Used in Political Game, TUSCALOOSA NEWS, June 6, 1999, at

ALA. DEP'T OF CONSERVATION OF NAT. RESOURCES ET AL.,
AGREEMENT & STRATEGY FOR THE ALABAMA STURGEON 4 (2000).

CONSERVATION

108. Mayden & Kuhajda, supra note 92, at 241-73.
109. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule to List the Alabama
Sturgeon as Endangered. 65 Fed. Reg. 26,440 (May 5, 2000) (list of endangered and
threatened wildlife codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11).
110. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Rule to List the
Alabama Sturgeon as Endangered, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,676 (proposed Mar. 26, 1999) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
111. Michael Sznajderman, Big Fuss Over an Alabama Fish, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Aug. 11,
1999, at 1A, 6A; see also Shelby, supra note 106.
112. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule to List the Alabama
Sturgeon as Endangered. 65 Fed. Reg. 26,448 (May 5, 2000) (list of endangered and
threatened wildlife codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11).
113. Id. at 26,438.
114. Id. at 26,448.
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upon biologists to determine which species are endangered. Although
the decisions over endangered or threatened status must be made with
the "best scientific and commercial data available," 1 5 there are no
requirements or guidelines for determining if a group of organisms
represents a distinct species. Therefore, the definition and identification
of a species ultimately becomes the responsibility of the biologists
studying these organisms. Endangered species will continue to be
vulnerable to non-scientific attacks as long as biologists cannot accept a
biologically sound species concept to guide the search for biodiversity.
II. HOW THE WORD "SPECIES" HAS BEEN MISUSED
If asked to name an "endangered species," typical responses
from members of the general public would likely include cheetahs,
pandas, bald eagles, or other charismatic mammals and birds. However,
the power of the ESA to protect all biodiversity was not realized until a
small fish halted construction of a $100 million dam. 16 The ESA makes
no value judgments in prioritizing which species should be listed, but,
unfortunately, our own limited knowledge about the earth's biodiversity
results in biased listings. Only vertebrate groups and some plants are
likely to be studied and well understood." 7 This bias exists even in our
fundamental knowledge of what a species is, and is also reflected in the
ambiguity of the definition in the ESA.118 The definition, while singling
out vertebrates for protection below the species level, does not provide
any guidelines as to what species are or how they can be identified." 9
The definition of a species needs further clarification than what is
provided in the ESA; it is far from intuitive and is still hotly debated
within biology. 120 Without a widely accepted consensus among
scientists, and with no concrete legal standards, there is room for a large
margin of error in - and unscientific attacks against - the listing process.
115. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (b)(1)(A) (2000).
116. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
117. Public support for more charismatic organisms helps create a bias in conservation
projects even more severe than that seen in taxonomic work. See J. Alan Clark & Robert M.
May, Taxonomic Bias in Conservation Research, 297 SCIENCE 191, 191 (2002).
118. Kevin D. Hill, The Endangered Species Act: What Do We Mean by Species?, 20 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 239, 263 (1993) ("If the Act is meant to do more than just protect
charismatic megafauna who are valued for their sentimental appeal, the definition of
species must reflect the need to protect biodiversity.").
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2000).
120. See generally Joel Cracraft, Species Concepts in Theoretical and Applied Biology: A
Systematic Debate with Consequences, in SPECIES CONCEPTS AND PHYLOGENETIC THEORY: A
DEBATE, supra note 7, at 3; SPECIES: NEW INTERDISCIPLINARY ESSAYS (Robert A. Wilson ed.,

1999).
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This problem partially stems from the double meaning of the
word "species." The word currently has two different connotations in
science. One is a taxonomic unit used in classification, and the other is a
conceptual unit that is fundamental to the "building blocks" of natural
history. 121 The first meaning refers to the taxonomic category that was
created in the Linnaean hierarchy, while the second refers to a real entity
in nature that is the product of evolution. 122
Taxonomy, or the naming and describing of species, has its roots
as far back as the ancient Greeks, with Aristotle first subdividing the
natural world into groups with lesser categories within these. 123 Into
each group he categorized species, based on the "essence" of each,
assuming that there was an ideal template for each species upon which
the other members were based. 124 In the eighteenth century, Carl
Linnaeus devised the biological classification system that is still in use
today. 125 His hierarchy starts at the level of a kingdom, proceeding in less
inclusive groups to the genus and then to the species. The combination of
the Latinate genus and species name was used as the formal scientific
name, so that the species in question might be recognized across
languages. 126 At the time of Linneaus, it was still assumed that particular
species were placed on the earth by a divine creator, with sharp
discontinuities between taxa. 127 The concept of essentialism was also
widely accepted. 128
Today, the continued use of the Linnean hierarchy for
classification purposes forces taxonomists to accept-at least during a
species description-an essentialist, or typological, concept of species as
unchanging entities that can be precisely delimited. 129 The species as
taxon is still tied to this typological concept, although current knowledge

121. Mayden, supra note 5, at 103.
122. See id.; R.L. Mayden, A Hierarchy of Species Concepts: The Denouement in the Saga of
the Species Problem, in SPECIES: THE UNITS OF BIODwVERSITY 381, 388 (M.F. Claridge et al. eds.,
1997).
123. MAYR, supra note 85, at 56.
124. Id. at 66-67.
125. Id. at 57-58.
126. For example, the Scaphirhynchussuttkusi is the Alabama sturgeon.
127. MAYR, supra note 85, at 58.
128. "Essentialism" refers to a classification where kinds are grouped together based
upon possession of a defined attribute or property. Such a property is both necessary and
sufficient for being a member of the kind. See, e.g., David L. Hull, Are Species Really
Individuals?, 25 SYSTEMATIC ZOOLOGY 174, 176 (1976); Robert A. Wilson, Realism, Essence,
and Kind: Resuscitating Species Essentialism?, in SPECIES: NEW INTERDISCIPLINARY ESSAYS,

supra note 120, at 187, 188.
129. See Marc Ereshefsky,

Species and the Linnean Hierarchy, in SPECIES: NEW

INTERDISCIPLINARY ESSAYS 285, 287 (Robert A. Wilson ed., 1999).
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of biological patterns and processes has revealed that the typological
130
concept is inconsistent with the natural world.
The development of evolutionary theory has altered our
perception of species as fixed entities with distinguishing traits that can
be classified, the basis for taxonomic descriptions. 131 Adoption of
evolutionary theory meant that there were not necessarily clear
delineations between species; populations diverged over time into
separate lineages, a process called cladogenesis, 132 and change occurred
within the lineages over time, a process called anagenesis. 133 As a result
of this new theory, scientists could no longer argue that species must
have an unchanging essence wherein they could be defined as
immutable biological entities. The theory of anagenesis and cladogenesis
necessarily replaced categorization by typological differences between
species.
Systematics, a branch of biology investigating the diversity of
and relationships between species, has arisen as a companion discipline
to taxonomy and has provided insights into the pattern and process of
speciation. 34 These advances have supported Darwin's theory that
species are products of evolution and are undergoing constant change,
despite scientists' attempts through taxonomic process to categorize this
diversity at a particular point in time. 135 Some modem philosophers
argue that the current species problem exists because scientists have
been unable to fully assimilate the Darwinian revolution. 136 Whatever
the cause of the species problem, it is clear that the lack of a universally
accepted definition poses a challenge to biodiversity studies,
conservation science, and law. Until the debate over the species concept
is resolved, there will continue to be misleading and incorrect species
descriptions, as well as inadequate and inappropriate assessments of
biodiversity and conservation needs.

130.
131.

Mayden & Wood, supra note 7, at 84.
Hull, supra note 128, at 180.

132. E.O. WILEY, PHYLOGENETIcS:
SYSTEMATICS 8 (1981).

THE THEORY AND

PRACTICE OF PHYLOGENETIC

133. Id.
134. Id. at 7.
135. See Mayden, supranote 2, at 181.
136. See John Dupr6, On the Impossibility of a Monistic Account of Species, in SPECIES: NEW
INTERDISCIPLINARY ESSAYS, supra note 120, at 3. The pre-Darwinian understanding of
species was of an essentialist concept (i.e., species are immutable over time). However,
adoption of evolutionary theory meant that there were no sharp demarcations between
species (i.e., they could change during time, and at different rates). Thus, some argue, our
current concepts are unable to account for species because they have not fully incorporated
the change associated with evolution.
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The species concept debate is not a new problem in the fields of
taxonomy and systematics; neither has it been ignored in the
literature. 137 Entire books devoted to examining and defending various
species concepts abound. 138 Although the Biological Species Conceptthe original concept identifying species as reproductive units-may still
be the most commonly applied, a wider variety of concepts exist within
systematics. Indeed, Mayden identified at least 22 different species
concepts in a recent review of the subject.139
The first problem preventing a common understanding of the
meaning of a "species" is the double meaning of the word itself. As
mentioned above, a species is a taxonomic unit of classification used by
researchers in an effort to understand the pattern of life. 140 Species are
also known to be the fundamental unit in natural history, the actual
entities undergoing evolution and other natural processes.' 41 Because
these real entities are constantly changing over time, under this usage
species can only be described, they cannot be statically defined. They
exist independent of our attempts to classify them. True species in nature
have a distinct beginning (speciation) and end (extinction) and
participate in cohesive processes such as reproduction or replication,
which maintain the lineage over time. 142 However, species as described
and named through the taxonomic process are human-imposed
groupings, used as our best guess to identify and classify these real
entities. Such groupings are merely a hypothesis-our attempt to utilize
the best available data to deduce these natural patterns and use them for
further scientific studies. The inherent problem in defining a species
surfaces when we attempt to reconcile these real entities with our limited
ability to group, classify, and list all of the world's biodiversity.
Debates over species concepts tend to focus on the evidence used
to identify species as a taxonomic unit rather than on the fundamental
nature of a species itself. 143 Understanding a species as an entity
137.

See Mayden, supra note 2, at 176.

138.

See, e.g., SPECIES: THE UNrrs OF BIODIvERsrrY, supra note 122; ENDLESS FORMS:

SPECIES AND SPECIATION (Daniel J. Howard & Stewart H. Berlocher eds., 1998); SPECIATION
AND THE RECOGNITION CONCEPT: THEORY AND APPLICATION (David M. Lambert & Hamish
G. Spencer eds., 1995); Hey, supra note 1; SPECIES CONCEPT'S AND PHYLOGENETIC THEORY: A

DEBATE, supra note 7.
139. Mayden, supra note 122, at 389.
140. Id. at 387.
141. Id. at 388.
142. Hull, supranote 128, at 177. See also Mayden, supra note 2, at 179.
143. This occurs both in biology and law; the majority of debates surrounding how a
species is defined focus on the empirical methods used for a research study, rather than
question the conceptualization of species. See, e.g., Kevin W. Grierson, The Concept of Species
and the Endangered Species Act, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 463, 486 (1992); Alan R. Templeton, The
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constituting a key component of natural history is largely a theoretical
problem. Actually finding, quantifying, and describing these units leads
to an operational question concerning which characters' 44 of a species
may be validly used to recognize and diagnose the species. But before
scientists can work to discover and describe new species via an
operational method, it is imperative that they properly conceptualize
what a species is in the theoretical sense, in order to maintain an
approach to taxonomy consistent with our current knowledge of the
origin of species through evolution.145 Thus, there are two different types
of species concepts: theoretical concepts and operational concepts.
Theoretical concepts assume that species exist in nature
regardless of our understanding of them or our ability to recognize them.
The concepts recognize species as real entities, not merely groups
constructed for human benefit. Because of these attributes, a theoretical
species concept provides a framework that allows researchers to develop
and test hypotheses regarding the existence of a species, an essential
element of scientific studies. 146 Thus, the goal of a good operational
definition is to assist scientists in identifying natural groups existing in
nature that are consistent with the theoretical concept of a species.
In turn, operational concepts are meant to provide both a logical
basis and methods by which scientists can delineate a species.
Operational concepts and methods are based upon variously observed
patterns, processes, and functions considered characteristic of species
and which are identifiable, provided a user follows a standard set of
methods. 147 If scientists simply use an operational definition of a species
to form the basis of their understanding of these natural groups, they
limit their ability to further identify biodiversity by the inherent
restriction 48 or circular reasoning 149 that comes with sole reliance on an
Meaning of Species and Speciation: A Genetic Perspective, in SPECIATION AND IT
CONSEQUENCES 3, 3 (Daniel Otte & John A. Endler eds., 1989) ("[A] species concept can be
evaluated only in terms of a particular goal or purpose," indicating a use of species
concepts only to further the study of a subdiscipline in biology, not to understand
philosophically what a species is.").
144. A character is "a feature (attribute, observable part) of an organism." WILEY, supra
note 132, at 8.
145. Mayden, supranote 5, at 96.
146. See Mayden, supra note 2, at 184. Species descriptions should be treated as
hypotheses of lineage independence, to be empirically tested. Without operational criteria
for testing, biologists may learn little from studying arbitrarily defined taxa with no uniting
theoretical basis.
147. Mayden & Wood, supra note 7, at 94.
148. Id. at 95. For example, a hypothetical species concept that only accepts as valid
species differences in consistent patterns of female coloration would ignore the diversity
that becomes apparent seasonally when breeding males exhibit different colors within the
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operational definition. The operational concept guides our efforts to
identify diversity, but it is important to remember that currently
described species remain merely hypotheses of independent lineages. A
scientist's recognition of a group of individual organisms as a species,
based upon observed differences, does not necessarily mean the
organisms naturally interact as a single species. Indeed, it is very
possible that what is currently recognized as a single species may
actually contain multiple lineages not currently identified.1 50 Thus, it is
essential that those involved in species conservation understand that both
theoretical and operational definitions are necessary to help biologists
find, describe, classify, and protect biodiversity, in addition to providing
the proper legal means to do so.
The principal complaint about theoretical species concepts is that
they fail to guide our search for biodiversity by neglecting to set limits
defining exactly how distinct two entities must be before each can be
considered separate species.' 51 Such proposed limits may include a set
amount of genetic difference, complete reproductive isolation, or
obvious morphological differences.1 52 All of these characteristics have
been used as the basis for at least one operational species concept. 53
However, using one single criterion as a means of recognizing separate
species will only ensure that all biodiversity will fail to be recognized. 5 4
Theoretical definitions for species descriptions must be able to
recognize all of the species that are part of the earth's biodiversity.
Taxonomists then must be flexible in the methods and tools or the

recognized species. The operation used is strictly based upon the conception of reality of
the user of that operation-a conception that may be artificial or real for that species (e.g.,
colors perceived by Homo sapiens may not be comparable to colors perceived by the species
we study).
149. See Wiley, supra note 7, at 18. For example, a hypothetical species concept that only
accepts differences in females as valid species would ignore diversity that becomes
apparent when breeding males take on different colors.
150. This is often referred to as cryptic biodiversity. See Robert S. Butler & Richard L.
Mayden, Cryptic Biodiversity, 28 ENDANGERED SPECIES BULL. 24, 24 (2003).
151. Ernst Mayr, A Critique from the Biological Species Concept Perspective: What Is a
Species, and What Is Not?, in SPECIES CONCEPTS AND PHYLOGENETIC THEORY: A DEBATE,
supra note 7, at 93, 97.
152. Id.
153. See Theodosius Dobzhansky, Mendelian Populations and Their Evolution, 84 AM.
NATURALIST 401, 405 (1950) (discussing the genetic species concept); Ernst Mayr, Speciation
Phenomena in Birds, 74 Am. NATURALIST 249, 256 (1940) (discussing the biological species
concept); C.T. Regan, Organic Evolution, 1926 BRITISH ASSOCIATION FOR ADVANCEMENT OF
SCIENCE REPORT OF NINETY-THIRD MEETING 75 (discussing the morphological species
concept).
154. Mayden, supra note 5, at 110.
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operational concepts they use to recognize diversity.15 Good operational
concepts should enable researchers to delineate a wide variety of
lineages that are consistent with theoretical concepts and should not be
restricted to only those concepts that favor a single method. The current
species concepts illustrate the importance of this linkage between
theoretical and operational concepts.
One of the most widely accepted and easily understood concepts
in use today is the Biological Species Concept (BSC). 156 The BSC simply
defines species as reproductively isolated groups that cannot successfully interbreed with other groups 57 Thus, under the BSC, the definitive
criterion for what is considered a species is the ability to successfully
interbreed. Although the BSC possesses both ecological and genetic
components, the definition does not emphasize morphological
difference. Thus, the definition is solely operational insofar as
reproductive isolation is used as the principle testable method to
discover new species. 58
One legal article states that the BSC "works well most of the
time" for endangered species decisions because "the vast majority of
species are sexual, and occur in isolated points in space-time." 159 Other
non-biological arguments in favor of the BSC highlight the fact that
reproductive isolation can be quantified using genetic analysis and
allows for the presence of hybrid zones. 160 However, these very qualities
illustrate the biological flaws of the BSC. In particular, there is no lineage
155. Id. at 111; see also Peter C.H. Pritchard, Status of the Black Turtle, 13 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 1000, 1003 (1999). Pritchard states that it is "vital that systematists avoid
dependence upon a single 'favored technique' for answering questions relating to the rank
of related taxa and instead utilize all the tools at their disposal." Id. This conclusion stems
from the debate over the status of the black turtle, which is known to be distinct from the
green turtle based upon consistent morphological differences, despite few genetic
differences.
156. The BSC is widely used among ornithologists and mamrnmalogists, partly due to the
influence that the author of this concept has among specialists in these groups. See Cracraft,
supra note 120, at 4. This is also the concept commonly introduced in introductory
biological textbooks. See, e.g., SYLVIA MADER, BIOLOGY 1, 332 (4th ed. 1993); CECIE STARR &
RALPH TAGGART, BIOLOGY: THE UNITY AND DIVERSITY OF LIFE 2, 298 (8th ed. 1998).
157. The BSC contains both a genetic and ecological component and is defined as:
a group of populations which replace each other geographically or
ecologically and of which the neighboring ones intergrade or hybridize
wherever they are in contact or which are potentially capable of doing so
(with one or more of the populations) in those cases where contact is
prevented by geographical or ecological barriers.
Mayr, supra note 151.
158. Mayden & Wood, supranote 7, at 96.
159.

MARTY BERGOFFEN, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT REAUTHORIZATION: A BIOCENTRIc

APPROACH 11 (1995).
160. Hill, supra note 118, at 262.
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perspective given to the evolution of species. By ignoring this
fundamental aspect of species, the BSC does not offer any acknowledgement that the theoretical nature of species is as evolving entities.
Moreover, although it does provide an operational method for
identifying species through reproductive isolation, such a method is
difficult to put into practice. It may be hard to determine exactly when
interbreeding is possible and does naturally occur between two
populations. 161 Exclusive use of this criterion limits the biological
diversity that can be discovered under the BSC. For example, evidence
has been found of gray wolves and coyotes interbreeding in disturbed
habitats across Minnesota, Quebec, and Ontario. 162 If a strict application
of the BSC were used, these species would no longer be recognized as
distinct, but instead would be converged into one species. Application of
the BSC therefore results in the loss of recognized biodiversity. 163
One further problem of the BSC is its applicability only to sexual
organisms, a limitation that greatly reduces its effectiveness in
recognizing diversity. Despite the prevalence of scientific research
conducted on sexual - primarily vertebrate - animals, an unknown, but
large amount of the earth's diversity is composed of asexual species. 64
These cannot be identified using the BSC. Were the BSC strictly applied
to all biodiversity, there would be a great decline in the number of
recognized species, less scientific understanding of the nature of these
species, and less effective conservation priorities. 165
The Evolutionary Species Concept (ESC) is generally accepted as
the best theoretical concept currently available to guide our quest to
catalogue the Earth's biodiversity. 166 Under the ESC, Wiley first
described a species as "a single lineage of ancestral descendent
populations of organisms which maintains its identity from other such
161. The reproductive isolation test is particularly troubling when used on species that
do not even occur in overlapping regions. Interbreeding in nature will not occur naturally
without outside intervention on the part of the researcher, and it makes little sense for
biologists to test for possibility of hybridization by forcing individuals from disparate areas
together in a laboratory setting.
162. See Niles Lehman et al., Introgression of Coyote Mitochondrial DNA into Sympatric
North American Gray Wolf Populations, 45 EVOLUTION 104, 108 (1991).
163. Mayden & Wood, supra note 7, at 97; Paul-Michael Agapow et al., The Impact of
Species Concept on Biodiversity Studies, 79 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 161, 163 (2004).
164. Unfortunately, microbiology is still largely uncharted territory in biology; current
estimates of diversity range from 105 to 107 species. Part of this is due to the ability for
bacteria to rapidly accumulate genetic mutations that lead to new species. See William B.
Whitman et al., Prokaryotes: The Unseen Majority, 95 PROc. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 6578, 6582
(1998).
165. See Mayden & Wood, supranote 7, at 97.
166. Mayden, supra note 122, at 396.
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lineages and which has its own evolutionary tendencies and historical
fate." 167 When this concept was first proposed, Wiley felt that it would
allow for hypotheses and testing of proposed species classifications
because their populations might be compared to discover separate
evolutionary lineages. 168 However, as scientific understanding of species
changed, so has the ESC. These "ancestral descendent" populations are
no longer part of the definition that, in its most recent incarnation,
asserts that "[a]n evolutionary species is an entity composed of
organisms that maintains its identity from other such entities through
time and over space and that has its own independent evolutionary fate
169
and historical tendencies."
The ESC is accepted as a strong theoretical concept, but
operationally, it is not practical to use. Species cannot be identified based
upon observing evolution of an independent lineage; the process can
only be inferred from data. 170 Some criticize the ESC for not providing
171
For
any unique information about the significance of a species.
example, Mayr argues that the "capacity for evolving is not the crucial
biological criterion of a species," as every population, structure, or organ
has this ability. 172 Another, similar, complaint regarding the ESC relates
to its general nature; under the ESC, almost any separate population
73
could be construed as its own lineage, and, thus, a separate species.
Some critics feel that applying the ESC to any group of organisms could
vastly increase the number of recognized species, as any geographically
174
However,
isolated populations might be found to be distinct species.
proponents of the ESC argue that it is valid to recognize any population
that maintains its own identity because it is no longer influenced by even
75
The ESC does not limit
minimal gene flow with its closest relatives.
the recognition of species by subjective, human imposed limits.

167.
168.
169.

Wiley, supra note 7, at 18.
Id. at 21.
Edward 0. Wiley & Richard L. Mayden, The Evolutionary Species Concept, in SPECIES

CONCEPTS AND PHYLOGENETIC THEORY: A DEBATE, supra note 7, at 70, 73.

170. Jack W. Sites, Jr. & Keith A. Crandall, Testing Species Boundaries in Biodiversity
Studies, 11 CoNSERVATION BIOLOGY 1289,1292 (1997).
171. Mayr, supra note 151, at 97.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 97-98.
174. Id. at 98.
175. Edward 0. Wiley & Richard L. Mayden, A Defense of the Evolutionary Species
Concept, in SPECIES CONCEPTS AND PHYLOGENETIC THEORY: A DEBATE, supra note 7, at 198,
200.
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The Phylogenetic Species Concept (PSC) was first developed as
an offshoot of phylogenetic systematics. 176 There are three different
interpretations of this concept, all of which are considered operational.
The first involves monophyly 77 as the single criterion. 178 The second
emphasizes that species should be distinguishable via a "unique
combination of character states in comparable individuals." 79 The last
concept incorporates both of the previous criteria into a monophyletic,
diagnosable species. 180 In each of these definitions, the species is the
smallest appropriate unit of analysis.18' Although these concepts do
make important distinctions in how species are recognized operationally,
they are similar enough to be discussed together for the purposes of this
article.
The PSC is a very appealing operational concept because the
criteria for identifying a species are very clearly outlined. The PSC favors
use of any valid character to delineate a species, not the single criterion
of interbreeding. 182 This is beneficial when working with any species, as
all differences are considered important under the PSC. In addition,
because it allows for the use of any character, the PSC is also able to
accommodate both asexual and sexual species. However, there are
disagreements over the concept's validity. Some scientists feel it is too
arbitrary in that it allows any individual character to describe a new
species. 183 Individual taxonomists are left to decide how many unique
characters are needed to delineate taxa. 84 This allows for variation in
how different scientists conceptually view a species. It has also been
stated that species described using the PSC are artificially created
through the fabrication of the human mind and are only reflections of

176. Mayden, supra note 122, at 405. Phylogenetic systematics is a specific approach to
systematics that studies the history of speciation; the recovery of evolutionary relationships
is then used to guide classification schemes. See WILEY, supranote 132, at 6.
177. "Monophyly" is a term denoting a group that shares a common ancestor; thus,
when used in a species concept, all members of that species should share a most recent
common ancestor, with no members excluded.
178. See Donn E. Rosen, Vicariant Patterns and Historical Explanation in Biogeography, 27
SYSTEMATIC ZOOLOGY 159, 176 (1978).

179. K.C. Nixon & Quentin D. Wheeler, An Amplification of the Phylogenetic Species
Concept, 6 CLADISTIcS 211, 218 (1990).
180. See Mary C. McKitrick & Robert M. Zink, Species Concepts in Ornithology, 90
CONDOR 1, 2 (1988).
181. Mayden & Wood, supra note 7, at 102.
182. Brent D. Mishler & Edward C. Theriot, The Phylogenetic Species Concept (sensu
Mishler and Theriot): Monophyly, Apomorphy, and Phylogenetic Species Concepts, in SPECIES
CONCEPTS AND PHYLOGENETIC THEORY: A DEBATE, supra note 7, at 44,45.

183.
184.

Mayr, supra note 151, at 99.
Id.
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185
With these points in
patterns in the natural world, not processes.
concept, but
operational
as
an
useful
is
PSC
the
that
apparent
it
is
mind,
concept.
theoretical
not as a
Some species concepts that have been proposed are grounded
more in policy than science. The Geopolitical Species Concept (GSC)
recently was developed in response to the controversy over the status of
86
the black turtle, Chelonia agassizii.1 Karl and Bowen, feeling that there
were no scientific data supporting the recognition of a distinct black
turtle species, proposed the black turtle was only a species based upon a
GSC.187 They defined geopolitical species as "groups of individuals
confined to geographically or politically defined areas" that are
"accorded species status independent of morphological, genetic, and
reproductive criteria." 18 Although Karl and Bowen's recent analysis of a
single nuclear gene and mitochondrial DNA did not reveal a difference
89
black turtles have long been
between black and green turtles,
recognized as a different species based upon morphological
differences. 190 These consistent morphological differences are enough to
differentiate the black turtle from the green turtle even without the use
of the GSC.
As stated explicitly by Karl and Bowen, the GSC is not based
191
upon scientific data to support hypotheses regarding species status.
Instead, the concept was intended for conservation purposes, as a
method of identifying species that have become imbedded into local
192
folklore and are recognized as distinct by different cultures. However,
there is little need, from a conservation standpoint, to change accepted
taxonomy to reflect conservation needs. When writing the ESA,
Congress did attend to geopolitical boundaries during the listing
process, allowing for the protection of animals endangered within the
United States, even if a significant amount of their range is in another
country and not in jeopardy. 193 During authorizations in 1979, Congress

185. Id. at 100.
186. Stephen A. Karl & Brian W. Bowen, EvolutionarySignificant Units Versus Geopolitical
Taxonomy: Molecular Systematics of an Endangered Sea Turtle (Genus Chelonia), 13
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 990, 996 (1999).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 994.
190. Black turtles have darker pigmentation patterns, a smaller size, and a different
shell shape than green turtles. See Pritchard, supra note 155, at 1001-02.
191. Karl & Bowen, supra note 186, at 996. Karl and Bowen "propose the label geopolitical
species (GS) for taxonomic designations that persist, but for which there are essentially no
supporting data."
192. Id.
193. H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 10 (1973).
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repeated that "the U.S. population of an animal should not necessarily be
permitted to become extinct simply because the animal is more abundant
elsewhere in the world. " 19 Thus, under the ESA, species with
international distributions can be legally protected, leaving no valid
reason for using an insufficient species concept to recognize these
"geopolitical species."
Moreover, using the GSC for species protection under the ESA
will only damage conservation efforts. If there are no scientific data
behind the decision to recognize a new species, it will undermine the
efforts of those attempting to conserve biodiversity by wasting valuable
time and resources on non-imperiled species or even opening the door
for bad publicity for science as seen in the case of the Alabama sturgeon.
The GSC does not provide an enhanced understanding of true species
diversity nor does it protect such diversity using ethical scientific
means. 195 Few species show a perfect overlap of political and biological
boundaries, but trying to defend a species designation made solely from
geopolitical boundaries will take away scientific credibility and waste
resources of the environmental agencies. It is imperative that biologists
do not refer to these domestic populations as species without sufficient
scientific data to support such a designation.
Another aspect of the species concept debate stems from the
ESA's inclusion of protection for "distinct population segments"
(DPSs).196 By including populations in the species definition, the statute
allows for the protection of animals with declining populations in only
part of their total range. For example, while managing the bald eagle, the
FWS simultaneously listed the bird as endangered in 43 states and
threatened in five states, and did not list it in Alaska due to differing
status in these areas. 197 This listing process observes geopolitical
boundaries; in other words, species may be accorded different protection
levels based upon their population's status in a particular area, not
necessarily across its entire range. Although this definition could be used
quite flexibly in decisions over protection of populations, it is normally
used in a conservative fashion. 198 During the 1979 authorizations of the
ESA, Congress instructed "the FWS to use the ability to list populations
sparingly and only when the biological evidence indicates that such
194. S. REP. No. 96-151, at 7 (1979).
195. See Kristin Shrader-Frechette & Earl D. McCoy, Molecular Systematics, Ethics, and
Biological Decision Making Under Uncertainty,13 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1008, 1011 (1999).
196. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2000).
197. Determination of certain bald eagle populations as endangered or threatened, 43
Fed. Reg. 6230 (Feb. 14, 1978).
198. See Robin S. Waples, Evolutionary Significant Units and the Conservation of Biological
Diversity Under the EndangeredSpecies Act, 17 AM. FISHERIES SOC'Y SYMP. 8, 20 (1995).
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action is warranted." 99 Perhaps because of the infrequent use of distinct
population segments, government agencies have had difficultly agreeing
upon how to determine when a population is distinct enough to warrant
a separate listing. The FWS and NMFS promulgated a policy of
recognizing the distinct population segments of vertebrates. Under the
policy, vertebrate populations must meet standards of discreteness,
significance, and conservation status. 200 The services have used this
policy sparingly, as instructed. Only ten percent of the listed species are
20 1
given status as DPSs.
Beyond these standards for vertebrate populations, the NMFS
has adopted the use of "evolutionary significant units" (ESUs) as a
method of clearly assessing biodiversity among Pacific salmonids. The
ESU, developed by Waples, 2 2 has attracted a great deal of attention due
to the controversy surrounding all scientific and policy decisions
directed at salmonids. 2 3 In order to be considered an ESU, a population
must (1) be reproductively isolated from other populations, and (2)
2°4
represent an important part of the evolutionary lineage of the species.
These two criteria are a compromise between the BSC and the ESC,
leading to a more stringent definition of a population than many use to
20 5
describe a new species.
Although the NMFS primarily depends upon genetic analysis to
determine reproductive isolation, such isolation may also be assessed
20 6
Measuring the
through tagging studies to examine migration.
importance of the evolutionary history of a population, or its
contribution to the species as a whole, requires the use of a diverse suite
of characters including determining distinct phenotypes, life history, and
habitat use of the population in question.20 7 The use of these prescribed
methods in ESU delineation makes this concept operational rather than

199. S. REP. No. 96-151, at 7 (1979).
200. Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrate Population Segments
Under the Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4722 (Feb. 7,1996).
201. Id. at 4722.
202. Robin S. Waples, Pacific Salmon, Oncorhynchus spp., and the Definition of "Species"
Under the Endangered Species Act, 53 U.S. NATL MARINE FISHERIES SERV, MARINE FISHERIES
REV. 11, 15 (1991).
203. See, e.g., Rohlf, supra note 4, at 637; David S. Pennock & Walter W. Dimmick,
Critique of the Evolutionanj Significant Unit as a Definition for "Distinct Population Segments"
Under the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 611, 615 (1997).
204. Waples, supra note 202, at 12.
205. Mayden & Wood, supra note 7, at 109.
206. See Waples, supra note 202, at 13.
207. Id. at 14.
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397

theoretical, which is understandable when the goal is to provide official
208
guidelines on how to recognize distinct population segments.
The ESU concept has certain merits; it emphasizes a lineage view
of species, is multidimensional and non-relational, and openly states
which criteria are important in diagnosis. 2 9 Rojas argues that this focus
on species as dynamic evolutionary units is crucial for conservation, as it
leads to better management decisions that allow for adaptive
management for the evolutionary capacity of the organisms to respond
to environmental change. 210 The ESU concept is also popular because it
allows for decisions about reproductive isolation to be made in a testable
fashion, through genetic analysis. 211 If genetic similarities are found
between two populations, it is assumed to be evidence of gene flow,
indicating the two populations are not reproductively isolated, while the
presence of unique genetic characters are often used to support a
hypothesis of reproductive isolation. 212 To those looking for an infallible
way to identify distinct units, the ESU appears to be an ideal concept
since it can be used to create a strict genetic level at which a group in
question may or may not have enough diversity to be considered a
species. 213 The ESU concept is, fundamentally, an attempt to legislate this
genetic level through a combination of policy and biology.
Despite these positive aspects of the ESU, the concept is not
adequate for identifying or conserving species. Although many
biologists defend the significant role genetics plays in ESU decisions,
there are valid concerns that an analysis based solely on genetics will
overlook some actual species and prevent effective management
practices by not accurately revealing diversity. 214 For example, the dusky
seaside sparrow 215 was described as a separate subspecies because of its

208. Robin S. Waples, Evolutionary Significant Units, Distinct Population Segments, and the
Endangered Species Act: Reply to Pennock and Dimmick, 12 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 718, 719
(1998).
209. See Mayden & Wood, supra note 7, at 109.
210. Martha Rojas, The Species Problem and Conservation: What Are We Protecting?, 6
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 170, 174 (1992). By viewing a species as a "work in progress,"
management decisions can be made by looking at a species' ability to change and adaptabilities of greater importance in the natural world than the ability to maintain status quo.
For example, listing decisions could be based upon the variability in a population, an
indication of greater capacity to adapt than size of a population alone.
211. See Waples, supra note 198, at 9.
212. See id. at 14.
213. See Grierson, supra note 143, at 489.
214. See Mayden & Wood, supra note 7, at 110.
215. Prior to its extinction in 1987. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants;
Final Rule to Delist the Dusky Seaside Sparrow and Remove Its Critical Habitat
Designation, 55 Fed. Reg. 51,002, 51,113 (Dec. 12, 1990) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
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consistently different shade and song characteristics when compared
with other subspecies. 216 When morphological differences, such as
pigmentation patterns, are consistently seen between populations, there
is some underlying genetic basis for the expression of this difference.
However, because no genetic differences were seen in one small region
of its mitochondrial DNA, the dusky seaside sparrow was determined to
be indistinct from the other groups, a victim of "faulty taxonomy"
despite its obvious difference in pigmentation. 217 Although advances in
genetic technologies are important and can help identify biodiversity,
they should not be used to the exclusion of all other methods of
218
identifying separate species.
With the multitude of species concepts available, new species
descriptions may be rejected purely on the basis of a reviewer's
preference for a certain concept, without an examination of the scientific
merit behind how the chosen concept was applied. Alternatively, some
most biological studies involving
new species descriptions -and
species-do not identify the species concept used. It is impossible to
review these studies without knowing the theoretical basis upon which
research questions were posed. Moreover, as many more concepts are
advanced to aid us in delineating biodiversity, this debate will become
increasingly important for conservation purposes, and there will be an
even more urgent demand for a single accepted concept to guide our
search for biodiversity without error.
Mayden tried to untangle the species problem by creating a
hierarchy of species concepts. 219 In this hierarchy, one concept-the
primary concept-is the theoretical basis for species delineation,
encompassing what is currently known about the origin of diversity. 220
Secondary concepts can be used as an operational surrogate for species
recognition and diagnosis, as long as they are internally consistent with
the theoretical basis of the primary concept. 221 Every possible method of
recognizing a species is accepted through Mayden's hierarchy, which, in
turn, allows for the maximum identification of biodiversity. 222

216. Id. at 51,112.
217. John C. Avise & William S. Nelson, Molecular Genetic Relationships of the Extinct
Dusky Seaside Sparrow, 243 SCIENCE 646, 648 (1989).
218. For another example of pigmentation differences and species status, see Pritchard,
supra note 155, at 1001, regarding the black turtle.
219. Mayden, supra note 122, at 418.
220. Id. at 419.
221. Id.
222. Mayden, supranote 5, at 114.
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III. HOW THE HIERARCHY OF SPECIES CONCEPTS
STRENGTHENS THE ESA
Recently, the debate regarding species' definitions has arisen
from the desire to develop an easy, foolproof way of delineating the
group. 2 Among conservationists, the species remains the focal point for
conservation efforts, often standing in for entire ecosystems because of
their ability to attract public support and sympathy for an entire
region. 224 However, as highlighted in the Alabama sturgeon case, the
response to an endangered species can be far from enthusiastic if the
species is not considered distinct. 225 This has caused some
conservationists to beg for more taxonomic stability and an end to the
debate over species concepts. 226 However, a belief that one single
technique will identify all species provides the basis for most of the
misguided operational species concepts. Instead, the best way to allow
for an interface between theoretical concepts and operational concepts is
to use a hierarchical arrangement between the two. 227 While this idea is
not new to the biological literature, it has only recently been resurrected.
Mayr, a premier evolutionary biologist, first proposed using two
different levels of concepts in the 1950s in order to account for
differences between theoretical ideas and operational actions. 22
When using a hierarchy of species concepts, a strong theoretical
concept should be used as the primary species concept, giving the best
conceptual recognition of the full spectrum of the diversity of life. 22 9 It
should not be restricted by the conceptual boundaries placed upon any
operational action. While using this theoretical concept to guide
understanding of the existence of species in nature, secondary
operational concepts should be used by scientists to describe the patterns

223. This debate is not limited to either the biological or legal professions; both sides
have advocates who feel that this problem would disappear if a single genetic criterion
were used to establish management units, subspecies, or species status. See Grierson, supra
note 143, at 486, 487; C. Moritz, Applications of Mitochondrial DNA Analysis in Conservation:A
CriticalReview, 3 MOLECULAR ECOLOGY 401,405 (1994).
224. T.M. Caro & Gillian O'Doherty, On the Use of Surrogate Species in Conservation
Biology, 13 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 805, 810 (1999).

225. See Shelby, supra note 106, at 6D; see also Nick J.B. Isaac et al., Taxonomic Inflation: Its
Influence on Macroecology and Conservation, 19 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 464, 466
(2004).
226. Janice S. Golding & Jonathan Timberlake, How Taxonomists Can Bridge the Gap
Between Taxonomy and Conservation Science, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1177,1178 (2003).
227. Mayden, supranote 122, at 419.
228. Ernst Mayr, Species Concepts and Definitions, in THE SPECIES PROBLEM 1, 10 (1957).
229. Mayden, supranote 122, at 418.
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found in nature that are inherently consistent with the primary
theoretical concept. 230
Mayden argues that the traits used by biologists are simply
markers to aid in deciphering or testing for lineage independence. 23 1
These secondary concepts use differences in morphology, genetics,
behavior, or any other character to identify evolutionary independence
and distinguish the different evolutionary lineages. 23 2 Secondary
concepts may be used interchangeably, allowing for the greatest
recognition of all types of biodiversity. 233 Therefore, while the primary
concept allows for the understanding of species as real entities in nature,
the secondary concept allows for individuals to be placed into groups for
scientific discovery and study.
The use of different operational concepts to guide our search is
acceptable so long as the primary theoretical concept is an inherent part
of any study. Mayden's hierarchy accepts any current species concept as
a valid secondary concept if it is consistent with the theoretical
underpinnings of the primary concept. 234 With this restriction, the
hierarchy can be consistent among different researchers with respect to
the identification of biodiversity. Thus, the most important factor
guiding the species debate under this framework is the adoption of an
appropriate primary species concept - one that must meet several
criteria.
First, the primary species concept should represent our best
understanding of available theoretical and empirical knowledge,
especially concerning the evolutionary history of the proposed species.
Second, species must be viewed as entities changing in space and time,
not as artificial groupings. Finally, the primary concept must be able to
23 5
accommodate all ranges of life forms currently recognized as species.
The Evolutionary Species Concept best fits these standards and is the
most appropriate candidate for the hierarchy's primary species concept,
particularly since the ESC incorporates all that is currently known about

230.

Id. at 419.

231.
232.

Id.
See id. at 420.

233.

Id. at 421.

234. Id.
235. The largest problem related to many species concepts is their inability to correctly
diagnose asexual species. The Biological Species Concept is unable to identify diversity
within asexual groups as it uses the criterion of interbreeding, an activity that is not found
in these species. Thus, the primary species concept must allow for the existence of these
species rather than ignoring their existence because they do not fit the "normal"
expectations of natural groups.
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species and speciation without operational restrictions. 23 6 Thus, the
hierarchy becomes important in the correct identification and diagnosis
of species because of the role secondary concepts play in helping
systematists recognize distinct species. Although these secondary
concepts are not acceptable by themselves, they can be used as operative
surrogates for the primary concepts as long as they ultimately recover
237
hypothesized evolutionary lineages.
When used appropriately, the hierarchy is the best way to link
the theoretical conceptualization of species with operational methods
needed to delineate and describe a species. Individual researchers may
prefer to approach the hierarchy in different ways. In some cases, one
single surrogate concept may be sufficient to recognize species diversity,
while other users may feel more comfortable following an ordered set of
operations depending on the taxa of interest. Obviously, some secondary
concepts may be inappropriate for one group of organisms and may be
omitted from a particular study. 23
In other cases, the applicable operational concepts may be
grouped by their criteria for modes of reproduction, gene exchange,
monophyly, and diagnosability. Secondary concepts may be placed in
multiple categories depending upon their uses. Scientists can then
proceed through their data sets following the assumptions of the
different concepts and comparing results. As long as the theoretical and
operational concepts are clearly identified so that other researchers may
duplicate the tests and reach similar findings, the study has satisfied the
scientific method's requirement of reproducibility and may be presumed
legitimate. The use of the primary and secondary concept allows
scientists to compare species delimitation under differing operational
assumptions -a comparison that only recently has attracted attention in
taxonomic studies.239
Incorporating this conceptual hierarchy into practice no doubt
will meet with some resistance. In many cases, the use of different
secondary concepts leads to different estimates of diversity. 24° This could
have the effect of preventing consistency and increasing uncertainty in
conservation strategies. 241 In this way, the hierarchy does not fulfill the

236. Mayden, supra note 122, at 419.
237. Id.
238. As mentioned above, the Biological Species Concept does not recognize asexual
species, so it should not be used in any study examining asexual organisms.
239. Sites & Marshall, supra note 30, at 462.
240. Mayden, supra note 2, at 190.
241. A. Townsend Peterson & Adolfo G. Navarro-Sigilenza, Alternate Species Concepts as
Bases for Determining PriorityConservation Areas, 13 CONSERVATION BIoLOGY 427, 429 (1999);
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perceived need in science and law for prescribing one preferred method
of describing and recognizing species. A whole spectrum of surrogate
concepts would be available for use in listing decisions, leaving much to
the discretion of the agency and potentially preventing appropriate
review. In turn, courts might focus too much attention on the different
outcomes resulting from the employment of a particular surrogate
concept in a species description and subsequent listing decision rather
than the legality of the issue. Thus, by not advocating one clear-cut
standard, the hierarchy might be seen as granting too much flexibility in
determining species status and might, in turn, be more vulnerable to
attack in listing determinations, as in the Alabama sturgeon case.
Yet, even using a correct biological interpretation of species will
not prevent all controversy regarding status at the time of listing.
Biology, as a science that must allow for the development of new
hypotheses and theories, can never lead to inflexible decision making.
Species described by scientists are hypotheses of those biological entities
that may exist in nature. If too many uncertainties are present from
inconsistent results of secondary concepts, those formulating and
administering laws and policies will simply ignore potentially imperiled
species because their listing might seem too controversial, both to
scientists still trying to understand the groups and to the general public.
Thus, the hierarchy will not always provide additional certainty that one
population is, in fact, a different species, although cases where data sets
conflict substantially are rare.
One further concern for many biologists is that if the hierarchy
were to incorporate all secondary concepts as valid methods of
identifying biodiversity, too much diversity would be recognized. This
concern stems from the belief that the primary concept used, the ESC, is
too broad. 242 Perhaps this fear stems from our inability to comprehend
such an enormous wealth of biodiversity. Other biologists may be
concerned about the cost of providing protection to such a great wealth
of diversity. If more diversity is described and studied, it is likely that
more endangered species will also be recognized, leading to even fewer
resources for protected species. 243 Even those interested in protecting a
maximum of biodiversity have reason for concern about the potential
results from recognizing so much diversity. However, this hierarchy is
the only way to allow the scientific community to treat the current

see also Helen M. Regan et aL., A Taxonomy and Treatment of Uncertainty for Ecology and
Conservation Biology, 12 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 618, 619 (2002).
242. See, e.g., Mayr, supra note 149, at 96.
243. Agapow et al., supranote 161, at 169.
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taxonomy as a hypothesis while also giving conservation priority to real
species.
Healthy scientific uncertainty leading to debate and progress
must be balanced with the need for concrete decisions and action for
conservation purposes under the ESA. Although described species are
only hypotheses of historical lineages, many currently recognized
species are better supported by the use of multiple secondary concepts
and different data sets. The benefits of realizing and recognizing how
much biodiversity truly exists far outweigh the costs of describing it.
Indeed, the most beneficial result deriving from incorporating the
hierarchy is that actual units of biodiversity could be recognized, leading
to more productive utilization of resources during conservation. In
addition, adoption of the hierarchy would alleviate two mistakes that
stem from bad science and result in bad conservation: data chauvinism
and value judgments.
Data chauvinism, preferring a particular data gathering method
to the exclusion of all others, has become more rampant with the increase
in the number of techniques for identifying species. All too often the
newest technology is seen as the best and only way to gather data,
instead of being seen as an alternative method to offer new insight into
the group.
For example, despite the diverse array of characters available for
species descriptions, morphological characters have been preferred in
purely taxonomic studies. 244 In contrast, the proliferation of molecular
techniques in systematic studies has led to the identification of
unrecognized lineages, and represents a new approach to recognizing
species. 245 Some scientists tend to favor genetic analysis as their primary
method, both because it represents the latest technology and because it is
perceived to offer a solution to the problems associated with
morphological characters. 246 Many attempts have been made to set a
level of genetic divergence for a particular gene at which two
populations are assumed to be different enough to warrant separate
species status.247 If two populations do not show adequate genetic
244. Mayden, supra note 2, at 187.
245. Id.; see, e.g., Alan R. Templeton, Using PhylogeographicAnalyses of Gene Trees to Test
Species Status and Processes,10 MOLECULAR ECOLOGY 779, 780 (2001); John J. Wiens & Tonya
A. Penkrot, Delimiting Species Using DNA and Morphological Variation and Discordant Species
Limits in Spiny Lizards (Sceloporus), 51 SYSTEMATIC BIOLOGY 69,86 (2002).
246. Morphological characters, such as color or body shape, though easiest for nonscientists to use because they do not require sophisticated techniques, tend to be disdained
because they may change over an individual's lifetime or are environmentally controlled
through diet or temperature.
247. Grierson, supra note 143, at 489.
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divergence, then it is assumed that they are the same species. 248 For
example, one gene frequently used by systematic biologists is found in
the mitochondrial DNA, 249 which tends to evolve at a faster rate than
nuclear DNA. 250 This approach no doubt would please many scientists,
lawyers, and policy makers because it allows for discrete analysis,
management, and regulation of endangered species.
However, a common mistake made with respect to genetic
analysis is assuming that, because it is a fundamental unit of inheritance,
it will forever end all disputes. No one gene is appropriate for analysis
across all of biodiversity. For example, even the rates of mutation in
DNA are variable.251 Some groups of organisms, such as the sturgeon,
are known to have low rates of evolution in mitochondrial DNA. 25 2 In a
more striking example, unionid mussels, a highly endangered group of
invertebrates, have evolved different mitochondrial genomes among
males and females of the same species. These genomes may exhibit
larger genetic differences between sexes of the same species than
between different species. 25 3 Application of taxonomy based only on
248. See, e.g., Amy R. McCune & Nathan R. Lovejoy, The Relative Rate of Sympatric and
Allopatric Speciation in Fishes: Tests Using DNA Sequence Divergence Between Sister Species and
Among Clades, in ENDLESS FORMs: SPECIES AND SPECIATION, supra note 138, at 172, 176.

249. Mitochondrial DNA is found in the mitochondria, the cellular organelle that is
responsible for producing much of the energy used for cellular activities. It is inherited
through the maternal line.
250. Picking the most rapidly evolving portion of DNA is useful because differences in
composition will appear quickly, ideally replicating differences in the lineages of the two
species.
251. Jeannette Krieger & Paul A. Fuerst, Evidence for a Slowed Rate ofMolecular Evolution
in the Order Acipenseriformes, 19 MOLECULAR BIOLOGY & EVOLUTION 891, 896 (2002); see
also Mayden, supranote 2, at 188-89.
252. See Krieger & Fuerst, supra note 251, at 891, 895-96; see also Andrew M. Simons et
al., Phylogenetics of Scaphirhynchus Based on Mitochondrial DNA Sequences, 130
TRANSACTIONS AM. FISHERIES Soc'Y 359, 364 (2001). Sturgeons, a controversial endangered
group, offer a prime example of how genetic tests should not be the sole method to
evaluate species status. Alabama sturgeon, found only in the Mobile Basin, and shovelnose
sturgeon, found only in the Mississippi Basin, have been found to have low genetic
divergence as seen in two mitochondrial genes, despite obvious morphological differences.
However, the two river basins have been isolated from each other for one to five million
years, indicating that in this instance mitochondrial DNA does not necessarily evolve
rapidly and, thus, should not be used as the sole benchmark for species divergence.
253. See Walter R. Hoeh et al., Multiple Origins of Gender-Associated Mitochondrial DNA
Lineages in Bivalves (Mollusca: Bivalvia), 50 EVOLUTION 2276, 2278 (1996). Within the past
decade, evolutionary studies of mussels have uncovered this phenomenon, known as
gender-associated mitotypes. Because mitochondrial DNA is typically inherited through
the maternal line, there is usually only one form of it found in any individual. However,
within these mussels, an unusual type of mitochondrial DNA inheritance leads to certain
individuals in a population having both forms of the DNA. These two forms may be quite
genetically distinct; there may be up to 33% divergence between the two genomes. In this

Spring 2005]

SPECIES CONCEPTS AND THE ESA

DNA would create a miscalculation of recognized biodiversity.
Decisions on species status that are based on set distances across a small
section of total cellular DNA will provide as biased a perspective on
diversity as any other single suite of characters. 254 Exclusive use of one
type of data will not portray an accurate picture of biodiversity.
Closely related to the problem of data chauvinism are human
value judgments in science. While some scientists may be reluctant to
rely on anything but molecular data, others feel that species must be
visually distinguishable. There is a hesitance among scientists to accept a
species described solely on the basis of genetic difference, particularly if
the human eye can discern no obvious morphological differences from
another close relative. Indeed, public and political support tends to favor
conservation of obviously distinct charismatic species that make ideal
poster animals for environmental NGOs. Even with obvious
morphological differences, there may still be little support for the
recognition and preservation of a species without a general belief that
this species performs a special role in its community. 25
This type of value judgment and chauvinistic attitude regarding
data will drastically limit the recognized biodiversity, as species will be
identified only on a perceived notion of worth to humans. Use of a
conceptual hierarchy prevents this bias by explicitly providing for all
possible data to be used in species descriptions, so long as such data are
compatible with the theoretical framework that holds that species have
distinct evolutionary lineages and that the traits within a species are
heritable.
Value judgments also play a large part in decisions of what
species are studied, presented to the public, and, ultimately, saved.
Though mammals comprise only 0.32% of the described species, 256 they
make up 32% of the listed endangered animals in the United States. 257

instance, using a single criterion as a means to evaluate species status would result in an
overestimate of actual biodiversity.
254. Using one gene to distinguish species can be similar to using one sentence to
distinguish papers. In other words, just because two fairy tales begin with the sentence
"Once upon a time..." does not mean that they will end the same way.
255. Manuel Lujan, Secretary of the Interior for the first Bush administration, stated,
"Nobody's told me the difference between a red squirrel, a black one or a brown one." John
Lancaster, Lujan: Endangered Species Act "Too Tough," Needs Changes, WASH. POST, May 12,
1990, at Al.
256. Of the 1.4 million currently recognized species, see EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE
DnERSlTY OF LIFE 13-33 (1992), 4450 of these are mammals.
257. Calculated as a percentage of the currently listed animal species out of 1078 listed
animal species, 349 are mammals. Mammals still account for 19% of the listed species when
combined animal and plant species (1827 listed) are used. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
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This does not even factor in the relative abundance of mammals when
compared to the total estimated species on Earth, which may place their
abundance between 0.04 and 0.004%.258 The proportion of listed
mammals does not reflect a greater imperilment of this group so much as
human values dictating which species should be studied and protected.
In contrast, the conceptual hierarchy allows for better comparisons of
diversity across all taxonomic groups.
IV. CONCLUSION
The role of scientists in helping to identify species is paramount,
yet also vulnerable to attack by non-scientists and scientists alike. Both
groups have questioned the identification of appropriate units of
biodiversity in the listing of the Alabama sturgeon, black turtle, red wolf,
gray wolf, Florida panther, and dusky seaside sparrow. 259 Nevertheless,
determining species status is not a process that should occur in the
courtroom. Instead, it should be an objective process, supported by
scientific data and structured by a correct understanding of the various
species concepts. Because conservation biology is a science, it is
imperative that no decisions about species status are made with policy as
the principal goal. Allowing any other discipline to intervene with
taxonomic research will lead to bias and ethical dilemmas, neither of
which will aid the goal of conservation. 260 Although listing decisions are
unavoidably political, such pressure must not affect the science involved
in species identification.
While some may describe this call for independent taxonomic
research as further evidence of the "insulated ranks of university
ecologists," 261 bringing more political pressure and influence to the
science involved will not produce better results. An accurate scientific
understanding of species will no doubt aid legal protection, but a legally
based definition of species will not help discover diversity nor will it
provide an accurate assessment of the biodiversity of communities upon
which Homo sapiens finds itself dependent.
SPECIES INFORMATION: THREATENED AND ENDANGERED ANIMALS AND PLANTS, available at

http://endangered.fws.gov/wildlife.html#Species (last visited May 23, 2005).
258. WILSON, supra note 256, at 132 (Wilson estimates that between 10 and 100 million
species may be present on Earth.).
259. See, e.g., Karl & Bowen, supra note 186, at 997; Stephen J. O'Brien & Ernst Mayr,
BureaucraticMischief. Recognizing Endangered Species and Subspecies, 251 SCIENCE 1187, 1187
(1991); Vaughan, supranote 8, at 586.
260. See Shrader-Frechette & McCoy, supra note 195, at 1009-10.
261. Robert J. Taylor, Biological Uncertainty in the Endangered Species Act, 8 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 6, 6 (1993).
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Given the current climate surrounding the ESA, it is highly
unlikely that use of the hierarchy of species concepts will be mandated
through legislation. However, as scientific understanding of species
concepts evolves, policies reflecting that evolution must be modified,
both by agencies charged with protecting species and by jurists enforcing
the ESA.
Using outdated concepts to identify biodiversity is not only
distasteful to conservation biologists and taxonomists, but also contrary
to the ESA itself-both substantively and procedurally. The ESA was
written with lofty goals in mind and is aimed at protecting not only
species, but also smaller segments of species diversity that may be
threatened. 262 The statute is already prepared to accommodate a wide
spectrum of biodiversity and no doubt it will benefit from a more
inclusive definition of species without any codified change.
Understanding the true nature of species and appropriate
species concepts is important to a wide variety of disciplines working in
conservation biology. Use of the hierarchy of species concepts will
provide a better estimate of the number of imperiled taxa and a more
accurate identification of areas of higher biodiversity, in addition to an
improved understanding of processes creating and sustaining this
diversity. For the ESA, use of the conceptual hierarchy will ensure that
resources utilized in protecting species are, in fact, protecting real units
of biodiversity and not arbitrary delineations. Given the current
conservation crisis, it is vital that we not let antiquated species concepts
inhibit the scope of protection possible for truly endangered species.

262.

16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2000).

